Statement of Charisse M. Phillips, Director, Office of Fraud
Prevention Programs,
Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Social Security
of the House Committee on Ways and Means
and
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims
Committee on the Judiciary
Hearing on Preserving the Integrity of Social Security
Numbers and
Preventing Their Misuse by Terrorists and Identity Thieves
September 19, 2002
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committees:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear at this hearing on Preserving the Integrity of Social Security Numbers and Preventing Their Misuse by Terrorists.
I have had the privilege of serving as the Director of Fraud Prevention Programs, in the Bureau of Consular Affairs, for two years now. Previously I served in a number of consular sections abroad where I had front-line experience with document fraud, and with attempts by criminals, terrorists, and hostile governments to gain U.S. travel documents. I have been a consular officer for almost 17 years.
The Bureau of Consular Affairs is in the business of preventing travel document fraud. We have an integral interest in the quality of identity documents and vital records produced in the United States, because those documents form the basis of U.S. passport issuance. The U.S. passport is perhaps the most highly valued document in the world, because of the many benefits and privileges it confers. It is not “just a document” – it is the pass-key into our country.
We have developed an extremely tamper-resistant passport. In fact, passport and immigration authorities in other countries have told us what we have found ourselves – the U.S. passports now being issued are now so difficult to alter or counterfeit that alien smugglers have stopped trying to alter them.
Instead they are acquiring authentic passports that have been lost or stolen and then using “look-alike” travelers to match passports stolen from American tourists overseas. They are helping impostors apply for U.S. passports using identities stolen from U.S. citizens in the USA. They are also producing and selling counterfeit documents – birth certificates, driver’s licenses, Social Security cards – to aliens to use in applying for passports. All these documents are available – cheap – on the Internet.
Personnel of the Bureau of Consular Affairs are experienced at detecting these false documents. We have done studies of our passport issuances, and we provide training and information to our passport staff to kept them alert. But as home computers, the Web, and high tech scanners and copiers become more accessible, we need more and better tools for our people.
One tool that will help our officers is on-line access to Social Security Administration records. Comparing the documents submitted in support of passport and visa applications against the official databases of the issuing authorities will greatly improve the accuracy and integrity of the citizenship and identity confirmation process. We are currently working closely with the Social Security Administration and state vital records offices toward this goal.
I will begin by giving some examples of document fraud cases.
Let me tell you about the methadone moms. As these low-income women leave their drug-rehab clinics, they are targeted by alien smugglers. They are offered money – several hundred dollars, maybe – to apply for passports for their own kids. But, here’s the catch. They will submit photos of different kids, supplied by the alien smugglers. Who are these substitute kids? In the majority of cases, they are the children of people in the U.S. either illegally, or as permanent residents, but who cannot bring their kids to the U.S. immediately through any legal means. Their parents pay thousands of dollars for those fraudulent passports. How do we know about this? An alert passport employee. We are fortunate to have a cadre of trained, experienced and loyal personnel who detect these attempts to obtain our passports through fraud.
Operation Oak Park: Passport Agency Uncovers Criminal Document Ring
Late in 2000, the Chicago Passport Agency's Fraud Program Manager (FPM) linked 25 passport applications to a document fraud ring involving Nigerian nationals. A subsequent investigation conducted by the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Field Office in Chicago revealed the fraud ring involved one document broker, who was already under investigation by the U.S. Postal Inspector's Office, the Social Security Administration’s Inspector General’s Office, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Drug Enforcement Agency. With Diplomatic Security as the catalyst, the agencies and others formed a task force, "Operation Oak Park", under the direction of the U.S. Attorney.
The ringleader and his associates provided young women with computer-generated counterfeit birth certificates and immunization records that named the women as the mothers of non-existent newborn babies. They used those documents to apply for Social Security cards, which they passed on to the ringleader. He then created other counterfeit birth certificates, using the name on the Social Security card but with the date of birth of the ultimate recipient or purchaser of the documents. The recipients could then use the birth certificates and social security cards to obtain driver’s licenses and apply for passports. The ringleader charged about $5,000 for each fraudulent identity.
The investigation developed leads into Jamaican and Nigerian community-based criminal activities and implicated two Illinois State Bureau of Vital Statistics employees and one federal employee, who actively participated in the broader fraudulent documents scheme.
When federal investigators arrested the ringleader, he agreed to cooperate, spawning a subsidiary investigation, Operation Blind Date. Under guidance from the task force he arranged for his network of brokers to fly to Chicago to pick up their documents and meet a supposedly corrupt Social Security supervisor, who was in reality an undercover Secret Service agent. The Chicago Police Department was included in the operation and arrested eight of the ringleader’s associates ostensibly in routine traffic stops as they left his office so they wouldn’t suspect him of turning them in. Those arrested included six Nigerian nationals, a Kenyan and a Jamaican posse street gang leader who was sought at the time by U.S. Customs and the DEA for narcotics trafficking.
As part of a plea agreement, the ringleader took responsibility for preparing more than 100 sets of false documents. He was charged with fraudulently obtaining and selling passports and Social Security cards and counterfeiting birth certificates. He faced a possible sentence of 10 years imprisonment and a $250,000 fine. However, he did not give up as easily as it appeared at the time. In December 2001, his family informed federal agents that the individual, who was at home on electronic detention while awaiting sentencing, had passed away. However, when a Secret Service agent went to the morgue to identify the body he discovered that the corpse was not the ringleader’s. The family and their doctor allegedly conspired to kidnap and murder a homeless man, pass him off as the convicted individual and planned to have the body cremated as soon as the morgue released it. A manhunt for the ringleader ensued, and federal agents were able to track him to Massachusetts. He was apparently planning to flee the country to Poland where he had ties. He is still awaiting sentencing. The U.S. Attorney in Chicago has added capital murder charges to the document fraud charges.
West African fraud in Texas
Interagency cooperation is also active in other parts of the country to combat document fraud. The Houston Passport Agency’s region has two of the country’s largest enclaves of West African nationals in the U.S. The majority resides in Dallas and Houston, which has over 50,000 Nigerian residents. The number of scams involving West African nationals in this region grew so great that a federal task force comprised of various federal and local law enforcement agencies convened several years ago in an effort to share case information and develop joint strategies. The majority of passport fraud cases by West Africans detected involved additional crimes, such as marriage fraud, narcotics trafficking, credit card fraud, insurance fraud and Social Security fraud.
Another type of fraud we have seen involves altered visas used by people who are already in the U.S. to obtain a benefit. Copies of fraudulent visas have been submitted to the Social Security Administration and the INS. The SSA applications are most commonly submitted by citizens of the Former Soviet Union who have legitimately issued visitor visas. The visas are altered, however, to show work classification so that the person will appear eligible for a Social Security number.
Why Social Security Number Checking is Critical to Passport and Visa Processing
As state and local vital statistics offices improve the security features of their birth certificates to deter counterfeiters, deceased identity fraud will become an increasingly popular mode of fraud. Confirming a deceased identity is often difficult for Passport Agency Fraud Program Managers (FPMs) since many states have not cross-matched out-of-state birth and death records. Social Security data can be very useful in exposing attempts at passport fraud.
FPMs have learned to recognize potential fraud cases by spotting anomalies in passport applications. Among the most frequent indicators of passport fraud are:
In this scenario, a birth certificate is used to generate a series of new documents, culminating in an application for a passport. One hallmark of such activity is a readily identifiable timeline sequence of the respective transactions. First, a birth certificate appears, then a Social Security card or a document such as a state ID or driver’s license, and finally, the passport application is executed.
Often, a passport application shows omissions and references to third parties (e.g., a friend as the person-to-be-notified in the event of an emergency). In person, the applicant is generally unfamiliar with the assumed identity, thus tending to respond evasively and making claims that are generally inconsistent with his appearance.
Signatures on the applications may appear labored or obviously forged. FPMs are trained to detect handwriting that is not American in style.
Passport Agency personnel frequently check whether a previously issued passport was issued in error. The most useful method to do so is to obtain copy of the previous application and verify the subject’s Social Security number and check birth/death records and the FBI’s National Crime Information Center files.
If the passport was issued in a deceased identity a possible indicator would be a recently issued SSN or a record of two SSN’s issued in that identity. There will also be minimal personal data on the original application. If the passport was obtained based on a counterfeit or falsely filed delayed birth certificate, a new SSN in the applicant’s identity may have been issued weeks after the first passport was issued. The previous application may show a different SSN.
Consular sections at U.S. Embassies and Consulates also rely on Social Security records when handling immigrant visa case. Consular Sections overseas are sometimes hard pressed to determine whether an elderly petitioner in an immigrant visa case is still alive, particularly in cases where the petition was filed many years before. In other cases, the follow-to-join beneficiaries may claim the original petitioner is deceased in order to avoid a likely visa refusal resulting from ineligibility under the public charge section of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Sometimes there are also fraud problems when employment-based immigrant visa cases filed many years before for beneficiaries to care for elderly or seriously ill individuals raise questions whether the individuals still need such assistance. A check of the SSA database will in some cases provide definitive evidence of misrepresentation.
How the Department of State Combats the Fraud
My office has purchased from Social Security a CD ROM with death records of social security recipients dating back to 1936. We have made this available to our passport and visa personnel on-line. Fraud Prevention Managers in consular sections and passport agencies now have access to over 77 million U.S. death records via the Office of Fraud Prevention Programs’ Intranet Web page. Over 98% of the death records in the database are for individuals who died after 1962. However, the database only includes death records of individuals for whom a death benefit claim was made to SSA. It may therefore not provide a positive response if the decedent never worked or never had a social security number, even if that person is indeed deceased.
Multiple Passport Issuance Verification Helps Detect Fraudulent Passport Applications
Passport Services’ Multiple Passport Issuance Verification (MIV) feature of the new Photodigitized Passport Issuance System is a quantum leap forward in fraud prevention technology that is already paying handsome dividends.
Acting much like a name-check system, MIV automatically searches the passport files database for records of passport issuance during the past ten years and notifies the adjudicating officer if an applicant was issued a previous passport. It tells the officer how many passports were issued and for each issuance provides the name, date and place of birth, passport number, issuance and expiration dates. Some records also provide the Social Security number. This is proving to be a powerful tool for passport agency FPMs. A recent survey of ten passport agencies revealed that the MIV system detected an average of 25 additional fraud cases per month.
When questions arise concerning the authenticity of a U.S. birth certificate submitted with a passport application, FPMs often seek to verify the questioned document with appropriate local authorities. Over the years, FPMs have established informal working relationships with most of the state registrars in their regions.
Consular personnel also work with the National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems (NAPHSIS). At their annual conference in 2001 NAPHSIS members approved a Consular Affairs-drafted resolution recommending cooperation with the Department of State’s anti-fraud program. In the resolution, NAPHSIS recognized that cooperation with the State Department is essential to the integrity of the passport issuance process and the states’ vital records operations. The resolution encouraged all vital statistics offices to establish and maintain liaison with the FPM whose passport agency is responsible for their state.
We need to be able to confirm Social Security Numbers easily and routinely. Right now our people put a lot of energy into developing informal contacts to help them confirm Social Security Numbers and work histories. They rely on this information in suspect cases to help them quickly identify the bona fide Americans taking an innocent trip from the aliens, sometimes criminal aliens, who are seeking U.S. passports to evade the scrutiny of immigration officials around the world.
Our people also need help with confirming the bona fides of U.S. birth certificates and driver’s licenses. This country has more than 8,000 authorities issuing birth certificates, and more than 50,000 different versions issued by states, counties and municipalities. One commonly accepted proof of identity is the driver’s license. It is not commonly known, however, that high-quality duplicates of state licenses are available on the Internet, with only a removable sticker warning “novelty item” to deter criminals. Our passport workers have no way of verifying driver’s licenses, either on-line or though routine access. We call these documents “breeder documents” because they can all be used to obtain more identity documents. Over the past several years we have been working with other agencies to combat fraudulent use of these documents and detect counterfeits and other fraud.
We have begun to brief Social Security fraud investigators in identifying foreign passports presented with Social Security number applications. We are also working closely with the Social Security Administration to identify a way for us to routinely verify Social Security Numbers on-line.
We are working with the National Association of Public Health Statistics and Information Systems and the Social Security Administration to encourage states to automate their birth and death records. My office is also building a database of lost-or-stolen blank documents, such as birth certificates. We are also part of an interagency working group, headed by INS, on developing standards for U.S. birth certificates, to make it easier to identity counterfeits.
In addition, we are talking to the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators on standardizing driver’s license features. My office recently sponsored a pilot program at one Passport Agency to purchase readers to verify that the information on the front of driver’s licenses at least matches that on the barcodes or magnetic strips on the back – police departments use these same devices to detect underage drinkers. We are also developing a pilot program with one state Department of Motor Vehicles to construct a train-the-trainers program on foreign passports, and share information on trends in document fraud.
If we have this much difficulty with fraudulent documents in the United States, it is easy to imagine the problem encountered in our consular sections overseas. Some countries have automated, centralized records that are verified before passports are issued, and their documents are therefore easy to accept. In others, wars and natural disasters have destroyed vital local records, where they even existed. Poorly paid civil registry workers are also subject to pressure to fraudulently issue legitimate documents.
To counter this problem, my office maintains information on lost-or-stolen blank foreign travel documents. Every consular section has a designated Fraud Prevention Manager who is responsible for helping new officers learn the local documents, and for maintaining exemplars for reference. We have on-line country fraud summaries available for visa adjudicators to refer to. We train consular officers to detect altered or counterfeit documents, even when they have never seen such documents before. In addition, the U.S. Government has several programs to encourage countries to centralize and automate their vital records.
As much progress as we believe we have made, we continue to explore possibilities for improving our fraud detection. For instance, we would like to explore the use of commercial databases to help identify fraudulent applications. We will work with INS to obtain additional information from its records that would be helpful.
We in the State Department are proud of our fraud prevention programs and the technological improvements we are making. We will continue to work with the Social Security Administration, other Federal agencies, and the states to aggressively combat document fraud.