Statement of the Hon. Tony P. Hall, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Trade
of the House Committee on Ways and Means

Hearing on Conflict Diamonds

October 10, 2001

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Levin, and Members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate your holding this hearing today, and the opportunity to testify before the Committee again on conflict diamonds. 

You have a very strong line-up today, people who are working hard to end this scourge.  You also have two strong advocates for human rights to hear from B Frank Wolf and Mike DeWine.  I think you know where I stand; I'll be brief so you can hear from the other witnesses.

Why Congress Should Act

All of us work on issues that B let's face it B won't be affected much one way or the other, no matter what we do.  This isn't one of them.  This is something where action by American consumers, and the American Congress, can make all the difference. 

Consumers can make a difference, because we buy the majority of the world's diamonds B a product whose value depends entirely on its image as a symbol of love and commitment.  That image doesn't always match the reality that, sometimes, diamonds are used to fund terrible atrocities. 

Congress can help because, at the same time that American consumers are unwittingly helping fund wars in Africa, our country is the biggest donor of humanitarian aid to its victims.  That is a losing proposition: in the past decade B as we have spent more than $2 billion in humanitarian aid to the four countries involved in wars over diamonds B more than $10 billion in conflict diamonds has been smuggled out of these same countries.

There is one more reason for Congress to act.  Our country cannot afford to let this resource, which has channeled billions of dollars into black-market economies, turn into easy money for terrorists B whether they belong to organizations, like Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front, that terrorize Africans; or to Al Qaeda, whose cells are involved in a range of money-making activities that includes diamond trading.  I do not know the extent of Al Qaeda's activities, and do not want to be an alarmist.  But I do know that diamonds B the most concentrated source of wealth ever known to mankind B should be put off limits to anyone bent on destruction.  Especially Osama bin Laden.

Conflict Diamonds are Stolen Goods

Finding a solution to this illegal trade is not an easy task.  I know your focus, Mr. Chairman, is usually on finding ways to lift restrictions on trade.  I agree with you sometimes, and with Mr. Rangel and Mr. Levin sometimes.  But I share the commitment that you all have to letting trade be the engine of our economy, and of economies around the globe. 

However, this is not a question of free trade, or fair trade.  Conflict diamonds are stolen from companies and countries.  They are smuggled to avoid paying taxes that are one of African countries' key sources of income.  And then, most horrifying of all, they are turned into weapons against innocent civilians who might interfere with these thugs' control of the diamond mines.  In Sierra Leone, for example, rebels told many of their victims that they were forcibly amputating their hands as punishment for using them to cast ballots in the nation's first democratic election.

I respect the Subcommittee's concerns about fulfilling our country's obligation to the World Trade Organization.  I think the Clean Diamond Trade Act does that in several ways, which are described in material attached to my testimony. 

But I know that if conflict diamonds had been treated like other stolen goods by the countries that import them, or by diamond traders, this problem would have been prevented B or solved much sooner.   As the journalist and author Sebastian Junger put it, "If international diamond brokers made a concerted effort to avoid buying illicitly mined diamonds, groups such as UNITA and the RUF would have a much, much harder time bankrolling their wars."  I would add countries that import diamonds to the list that includes diamond brokers.

I know the Subcommittee is aware of the efforts both countries and companies have made to agree on the international framework B an approach that both industry and non-governmental organizations say is the only real answer.  Our State Department has been a steady participant in this work, as have the US Customs Service and other agencies.  This legislation is designed to strengthen their hand in these negotiations, and help prevent them from dragging into a third year.

Consensus Between Industry and Activists

Notwithstanding our diplomats' efforts, much of the work of the Kimberley Process to construct this framework has been driven by NGOs and the diamond industry, whose representatives have teamed up to support the legislation the Subcommittee is considering today.  Coming together behind a constructive solution was not easy B either for the Campaign to Eliminate Conflict Diamonds, which is a coalition of more than 100 human rights, humanitarian, and faith organizations; or for the World Diamond Council, whose members include all of that industry's many factions.  

The NGOs have been sharp critics of the diamond and jewelry industries, but were thoughtful and fair in taking the opportunity to work on a difficult problem together.   At a time when many of their colleagues in the same organizations are on the front lines of the battle for responsible trade, with a product made vulnerable by its own marketing success, and with made-for-TV images of terrible suffering, these advocates' efforts are nothing short of extraordinary. 

The industry faced an equally difficult challenge in compromising with critics B and I count myself among them B who sometimes have forgotten to acknowledge that its ranks are filled with honorable men and women, and honest business people.  Critics who have asked this industry to be much more nimble than those that sell oil, gas, timber, col-tan, or other products that have funded wars.

Compared to the distance this coalition has traveled in a few short months, the differences here in Congress B even in this room, even this week B seem easy to bridge.   But there's a catch: the NGOs have agreed to work with industry only until we adjourn this year.  The Campaign's representatives feel strongly that consumers need to be informed about how some of the money they spend on diamonds is used, and they believe that severing the funding for these wars is an urgent need that cannot be allowed to run the course of ordinary legislation.   I fully understand and support their unwillingness to put their work on behalf of suffering people on hold while Congress is in recess.

Likewise, the World Diamond Council and Jewelers of America also are anxious for Congress to act.  I think industry representatives are right to worry that protests and consumer-awareness events outside jewelry stores this holiday shopping season might make it very difficult to maintain the unusual alliance of miners, traders, and retailers that the World Diamond Council represents.

I hope the Members of the Committee will listen closely to what Adotei Akwei, Rory Anderson, Cecilia Gardner, and Matt Runci will say today.  They are among the very small number of people who have worked tirelessly to end the trade in conflict diamonds.  They each speak for tens of thousands of others who support the work their organizations do.   And they are right: Congress should join their efforts by passing the Clean Diamond Trade Act.

"We Understand What Suffering Is"

In the same spirit of cooperation that our coalition partners have demonstrated, Congressman Frank Wolf and I have worked with Republicans and Democrats here in the House and in the Senate.  We have strong partners in Amo Houghton and Charlie Rangel B and in Mike DeWine, Dick Durbin, and Russ Feingold. 

We have met with senior officials in the Bush Administration, and we stand ready to work with them and with you to craft a responsible and effective bill.  We are grateful for Chairman Thomas's commitment to move legislation this year, and appreciate your Subcommittee's contribution to that.

In closing, I want to draw your attention to part of a Wall Street Journal article published in the aftermath of the attacks on our country last month that described the reaction of other countries:

"Until last week, Sierra Leone had little in common with New York.  Now, the two share huge death tolls, obliterated landmark buildings and entire city blocks in rubble.  Tens of thousands of Sierra Leoneans were maimed, brutalized and killed in a 10-year war between rebels and various governments.  The blighted land is ranked last among 162 countries" by the United Nations.

The article goes on to describe how Sierra Leoneans are "reaching out beyond their own misery" to express "the sorrow in their heart" about the attacks.   An unemployed driver in a nation where Islam is the faith of most people, put it this way: "We feel America's suffering. . . because we understand what suffering is," Hussain Konteh said.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: Frank Wolf and I saw what Mr. Konteh was talking about two years ago, and it has weighed heavily on us ever since then.  We already understood what suffering is, as does our colleague Mike DeWine B who has made children's well-being a priority and logged countless hours and miles in helping and protecting them.  We understood not in the same way Mr. Konteh does, but we've all seen countless people suffering from hunger, or disease, or every atrocity and violation of human rights we'd thought imaginable.

Still, very few things could have prepared us for meeting the 2-1/2-year-old whose arm was forcibly amputated.   Or the 14-year-old girl who lost both arms and was pregnant with her rapist's child.  Or the young student who lost an ear, because rebels thought that would end his studies.  Or other losses that Sierra Leoneans we met in refugee camps described.

Even now, as our country joins the war that was declared on us; even now, as we worry for our soldiers' lives and our economy's health; even now, Mr. Chairman, I believe we must also address the trade in conflict diamonds.  This is a problem we can do something about, something we are in a unique position to address.  And, I would respectfully submit, if we can't do something about this suffering B with everything we know about its cause, with the specter of these wars' continuing until this problem is addressed, and with the support of everyone who is represented here today B if we can't do something about this, then we all ought to pack it in. 

Thank you for your work here and in the days ahead.  I appreciate the opportunity to testify today, and would be happy to answer any questions.

Frequently Asked Questions  - Clean Diamond Trade Act

Q -      Why is US legislation needed?  Aren't there UN Security Council resolutions barring diamonds from Liberia, the Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone), and UNITA (Angola)?  Isn't a targeted approach a better course?

A -       Sanctions against conflict diamonds, imposed against two rebel groups and the country of Liberia, are in place, but they are an imperfect solution because they do nothing to help block the smuggling of these diamonds through other channels.  For example, UNITA today earns $100 million a year selling its diamonds B despite the fact that a UN embargo has been in place for three years.

Nor are temporary UN sanctions an appropriate basis for a comprehensive system, which is what's needed to stop the current blood trade and to deter future wars over diamonds.  This is a global problem that cannot be solved with a piecemeal approach B whether that is UN embargoes, or individual producing countries' laws.  That is the firm conviction of the diamond industry, of civil society, and of others familiar with the problem of conflict diamonds.

Most observers believe the United Nations will endorse the global system being devised by the Kimberley Process, and it commissioned this work precisely because it knows the patchwork of embargoes is not working. 

Q -      Why should Congress act now on this problem?  Isn't a global solution imminent, one that has the support of a broad range of diamond-producing and trading nations, plus the diamond industry B and that is likely to be endorsed by the United Nations?

A -       Last December, the United Nations General Assembly voted unanimously to charge nations, aided by representatives of the diamond industry and civil society, with submitting a recommendation for a global system of controlling rough diamonds.  Participants in the Kimberley Process set forth a timetable for making their recommendation in December 2001 B but whether they will meet their deadline remains to be seen.  The most difficult decisions have not yet been made, and while progress has been good, there are valid reasons to be concerned.

The legislation provides ample room for this initiative, (1) by taking effect six months after enactment, and (2) by letting the President issue a waiver for any country that is cooperating through the Kimberley Process.  It does not pre-empt the Kimberley Process; in fact, it defers to it.  But few observers believe its progress will continue without the consumer pressure that the legislation articulates.  That was one reason the industry agreed to compromise with NGOs on this bill: to keep the Kimberley Process moving apace.

More importantly, the United States B as the world's largest consumer of diamonds, and the biggest contributor to humanitarian relief for victims of these diamond wars B has a rightful interest in ending this blood trade.  It is reasonable for our country to cooperate with international efforts, and this bill encourages that.  And it would be inappropriate for us to cede our responsibility to act, particularly as some 27,000 American jewelers likely will be the first to feel the impact of inaction, which will continue to tarnish diamonds' image in consumers' eyes. 

Finally, a coalition of all American stakeholders has called on Congress to act to fulfill the United States' moral obligation to lead efforts to stop the atrocities that conflict diamonds fund.  The coalition includes more than 100 human rights, humanitarian, and faith groups B the Campaign to Eliminate Conflict Diamonds B whose member organizations have the support of millions of Americans; and representatives of the diamond and jewelry industries B the World Diamond Council and Jewelers of America.   They reached a consensus on the Clean Diamond Trade Act (HR 2722) and the Clean Diamonds Act (S 1084) months ago and have agreed to work together through 2001 to win passage of the consensus these bills represent.

Q -      Would the system the bill requires be effective?

A -       The bill does not require any specific system of controls on rough diamonds.  Instead, it gives the Customs Service and the State Department leeway to define what a workable system is.  It does set out some minimum standards, which were recommended by the diamond industry and which have been used as the starting point by the countries participating in the Kimberley Process.  The bill does not spell out every aspect of the system for three reasons:

  1. Our obligations to the World Trade Organization require the United States to target problems that affect trade narrowly, so that importers have more than one way to meet our concerns.  Different importers should have different abilities to satisfy Customs officials that their diamonds are clean, because the situation in Canada may be different than in Sierra Leone, for example.  (This is not necessarily rue, but the presumption under trade law is difficult to refute).  The bill allows this "safe harbor" provision to comply with WTO rules.
  1. Some 40 countries, along with representatives industry and civil society, have been working for the past 18 months on an international system of controls.  Experts, including in the diamond industry, say that a comprehensive approach is the only serious way to address the smuggling that is at the root of this blood trade.  The bill is designed to encourage the Kimberley Process to complete its work, according to the timetable set by its own participants.  It is not designed to make their decisions for them, though, and therefore lets the system they devise satisfy US requirements contained in this bill.
  1. At bottom, this is a law enforcement problem.  Conflict diamonds are stolen, and smuggled across many borders.  There are, of course, laws in producing countries that are the primary victim of this crime (both because their people suffer terrible atrocities inflicted by rebels funded by conflict diamonds; and because they are losing $60-$200 million[1] per year in uncollected tax revenues).  These laws have not worked for two reasons: (a)  other countries participating in the diamond trade have done nothing to help enforce these laws, and that is the reason a global system is needed; and (b) any system or new law must be flexible enough to respond to criminals' abilities to find ways around them.  That is why the bill gives Customs officials flexibility to target this problem, and avoids spelling out exactly what steps they must take.

Q -      How would a system of controls on rough diamonds work?

A -       The primary focus of the system being devised by participants in the Kimberley Process is the first time a rough diamond is traded.  Models are being tested in Sierra Leone and Angola now, and have won praise from some of the sharpest critics of the diamond industry and countries that have ignored this problem.[2] 

Here's how the system works, in brief:

Here's how the system works, in detail:

From the mine/mining area to export - This stage of the process of exporting diamonds poses the most difficult challenge to implementing an effective system of controls.  That is because it is very difficult to monitor "the first 10 yards" a diamond travels from thousands of individual miners, to a diamond buyer.  This problem is the focus of continuing work, but currently the expectation is that the system would require a producing country to license miners and regulate their activities closely.  This once was a common practice, but has been neglected in some countries, a casualty of corruption and the chaotic nature of war. 

To help correct the inherent difficulty of monitoring the trade, especially at its start, the global system will give diamond-trading countries that participate through the Kimberley Process a forum for alerting producing countries to problems.   That will help dilute the incentive to cheat B because while a producing country will want to get all of its diamonds through, an importing country will want to protect its supply of clean gems from the taint of conflict diamonds.  It therefore will have an incentive to help the producing country safeguard its exports.  That help could come in the form of carrots (like financial assistance), or sticks (like rejection of diamonds whose origin is easiest to determine at this stage).

From first export to first import - Rough diamonds to be exported are taken to a producing country's authorities, who collect taxes on them (which average 3% and are the primary benefit African countries get from this resource; to keep this sum in perspective, rough diamonds now fetch about $60 per carat in Antwerp).  Authorities then issue a numbered export certificate on each parcel of diamonds, and log details about the parcel B including its total carat weight B on the certificate and into a database.

When the parcel arrives in the importing country (which is Belgium, in the case of 85% of rough diamonds traded), authorities check its contents against the certificate affixed to the parcel, and against the database.  Because experts usually can tell a diamond's origin before it is cut, they have this tool to help them judge the veracity of the certificate.  Even in the rare instance when they cannot tell where the diamond is from, they almost certainly can conclude it is not from the country issuing the certificate, if that is the case.  Several shipments have been interdicted in this manner already.

This ability to rely on a technical safeguard, and the expertise of Belgian authorities, makes this stage the logical place to focus enforcement efforts.  If diamonds entering legitimate commerce are clean B  and downstream countries protect the stream against imports from outside the clean stream B most smuggled diamonds (including those used to fund conflict) can be blocked from trading as legitimate goods.

From first import to first sale - The customers of importers whose export certificates have been validated have a legal basis for issuing a warranty to anyone to whom they sell these diamonds.  From there, each sale of the same diamonds B even if the parcel is broken up B can be accompanied by a warranty that traces its authority back to that first sale. 

The World Diamond Council, an industry association formed to address the problem of conflict diamonds, has pledged to monitor industry participants employing this chain of warranties and to take disciplinary action against any who use it improperly.  Individual buyers also have recourse, through civil lawsuits, against improper warranties.  Government or independent auditing of this chain of warranties would add credibility to it, in the view of civil society representatives and others.  Such a proposal is now under consideration by the industry.  However, US government experts doubt that a chain of warranties B whether it is audited or not B could provide a sufficient safeguard to constitute the basis for a government certificate.

The outstanding question is whether the chain of warranties is a useful contribution to efforts to block conflict diamonds from legitimate trade.  The answer may be determined by how many private businesses are willing to participate in the chain.  As offered, this initiative represents a good-faith effort by an industry whose active participation in safeguarding the clean stream is essential.  It could have a significant practical effect if it is widely used and, given the realities of the trade, that potential should not be underestimated.

From first import to subsequent export - To combat the problem of conflict diamonds' entering the clean stream of legitimate diamonds, some observers believe that rough diamonds should be accompanied by re-export certificates as they cross every border.  These would adhere to the same rules set forth above B the parcel's carat weight disclosed, a unique number recorded on the certificate and in a database maintained by the exporting country, and information checked by the importing country.  However, US officials and others disagree on whether this mechanism could be enforced.

One alternative solution to this transshipment problem may be the creation of a police force that has access to detailed statistical information and tough law enforcement powers.  The Securities & Exchange Commission offers one model for this: it routinely handles sensitive information which, like diamond trade flows, are considered proprietary by industry participants.  And the SEC routinely exercises police power that serves as a significant deterrent to wrong-doing.

Q -      Why doesn't the system simply require diamonds to move individually, in sealed packets with individual numbers that can continue to be tracked?  Alternatively, why aren't physical marks on the diamonds being considered B since those would be removed in the cutting process anyway and would not diminish the diamonds' value?

A -       Some 850 million stones trade every year, most of them in parcels of dozens or hundreds of diamonds until they are cut.  It would be a logistical nightmare to separate these parcels into individual diamonds.  Likewise, coating rough diamonds with wax that contains a special colorant (like US currency uses) B or etching a mark into individual diamonds, also would impose a burden, because either approach would hinder the sorting and cutting process by emplacing a physical barrier to the process of quickly judging a diamond's value.  As much of the value added by diamond traders is their sorting and marketing parcels of diamonds, this barrier's effect should not be minimized.

Between 80 and 95% of diamonds are not from conflict zones.  Hopefully, the wars that have been fueled by diamond revenues will end B with the help of these efforts B and a system of controls will remain in effect to deter future conflicts.  The bill endeavors to address the problem without imposing an undue burden either on industry or on countries involved in what is, for the most part, a legitimate trade.

Q -      Why doesn't the bill impose a system of controls on polished diamonds, or diamond jewelry?

 A -      Efforts have focused on rough diamonds because their trade (1) is where the problem of rebels' funding from conflict diamonds arises, and (2) lends itself to verification by technical means.  The goal is to prevent rough diamonds from being cut and polished B which is the point at which they gain much of their value, and the point past which no means of determining a diamond's origin currently exist.

The bill does close loopholes that could exist for polished diamonds and diamond jewelry, by requiring countries that supply the US market to get the diamonds they use from the clean stream.

Q -      This bill seems to be an effort to end diamond smuggling B a worthwhile goal, perhaps, but one that seems impossible to attain.  Will this increase red tape for legitimate industry, without stopping criminal smugglers?

A -       Smuggling is endemic in the diamond trade: estimates of its prevalence range from 22 to 40% of all diamonds traded.  The extraordinarily low tax paid on these transactions B 0.04% B underscores the loss African nations that depend on diamond revenues suffer at the hands of smugglers. 

But the bill's goal is more narrow: to end the smuggling that is used to fund conflict B whose costs are calculated in lives, not dollars.  Together with UN and regional peacekeeping, and other efforts, choking off the money that rebels and invading armies can earn by looting diamond mines promises to bring these wars to an end.  Ensuring systems are in place so that diamonds cannot be used to fund future wars, along with other efforts, will help deter more suffering.

No law can stop crime, but enacting this will enlist legitimate members of the industry B who make up the overwhelming majority of the diamond trade B in efforts to stop the most destructive smuggling: that used to fund wars.

Q -      Does this bill violate our obligations under the World Trade Organization?

 A -      Considerable care was taken to ensure that the United States does not violate its WTO obligations if this bill is enacted into law.

  1. As a general matter, the United States could defend against any WTO challenge to this bill under either the general exceptions (Article XX) or essential security exceptions (Article XX1) of the WTO (GATT 1994.  Court decisions on these exceptions suggest these exceptions could be used successfully to defend this legislation against any WTO challenge.  The Congress in its findings takes note of these exceptions.
  1. The bill provides the President with administrative flexibility so that he could implement the bill in a way that would withstand any WTO challenge.  For example, instead of requiring all diamond exporters to implement a single system:
  1. The bill provides the President with waiver authority that, if a WTO challenge were imminent, could be exercised to remove a country's standing to lodge that challenge.  This would give our diplomats the ability to try to work out any disputes before they rose to the level of a challenge to the WTO[7].
  1. Finally, the bill contains a self-correcting mechanism, so that if there were ever a WTO ruling against the United States, the Treasury Secretary and Customs would not be required to take any action under the bill that would be in violation of our WTO obligations[8].

The bill also was crafted to facilitate several defenses to any WTO challenge:

  1. GATT 1994's Article XXI permits a nation to assert it is acting in its security interests, (a) to address the traffic in arms or materials that supply a military establishment, or (b) in pursuance of its UN obligations B such as to enforce the current sanctions on the RUF, UNITA and Liberia, or an expected future UN resolution implementing the Kimberley Process. 

The bill includes findings[9] that would support the United States if it asserts a security defense against a WTO challenge.

  1. GATT 1994's Article XX(b) permits a nation to assert it is acting out of necessity to protect human life and health B so long at its action does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against a country, or is not taken simply to disguise a restriction on trade.

The bill includes findings that detail the toll conflict diamonds is exacting on human life and health[10] and that explain international efforts to devise a global approach to this problem[11].  The United States could use either to defend against any WTO challenge.

Q -      Would this bill increase costs to American taxpayers?  Would it increase the price of diamonds that American consumers pay?

 A -       The Administration has not indicated it expects Customs' enforcement or other costs borne by taxpayers to increase because of this bill.  

As to the price of diamonds, a regulatory system like the one the bill encourages should not impose additional costs on diamond traders that were significant enough to pass along to consumers. 

On the contrary: the diamond and jewelry industries support this bill, in part, because they are concerned that their sales may be hurt if they do not provide consumers with assurances that their diamonds are conflict-free.  Some are even investing in advertising to convey that message, despite warnings by the Federal Trade Commission and an industry ethics body that this claim cannot be supported until there is a system in place such as the one the bill encourages. 

If this problem is not addressed, jewelers likely will feel growing pressure to distance their wares from these atrocities.  Advertising and other costs, including lost sales B likely would be a heavier burden than anything a system of controls like the ones required by the bill might impose.

Q -      Will passage of this bill hurt America's effort to build a coalition against terrorism?

A -       The Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone is a terrorist organization, according to the State Department.  Moreover, there is strong evidence that al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden's organization, has been and still is involved in diamond trading in Africa. 

This bill's primary effect will be to put this resource B the most concentrated source of wealth known to mankind B off-limits to terrorists now wreaking havoc in Africa, and believed to be planing and funding future attacks in America.  Given that there is widespread acceptance of the need to address the problem of conflict diamonds, and because the bill provides so much flexibility to US diplomats, it is hard to foresee the day when sanctions are imposed against any country. 

Instead, the bill aims to encourage all countries supplying the US market with diamonds to take steps that will ensure Americans remain steady consumers of their diamonds B so that this luxury product doesn't go the way of ivory and fur in consumers' eyes.   Such measures are in these countries' own best interests, and most of them are working actively to put them into place.  The bill's goal is to make diamonds a blessing for all countries, instead of the curse they are on some.  The bill imposes no sanctions and it respects the rights of countries involved in the diamond trade to determine how best to address smuggling that should have been stopped years ago.

If it affects the United States' ability to build a coalition against terrorism at all, it likely will do so in a positive way B by addressing a terrible injustice and helping stop those who would terrorize Africans as well as Americans. 

[1]  US-AID estimated in 2000 that Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo lose $60 million per year in uncollected taxes B which average 3% on the value of rough diamonds exported from there.  A senior official of Botswana estimated (verbally) in 2001 that the total was $200 million.

[2] Global Witness, a British NGO, examined Angola's system of controls closely; its report is available on its website: http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/

[3] Section 4(a)(1)(B)

[4] Section 4(a)(1)(C) or (D)

[5] Section 5(A)(iii)

[6] Section 6(a), by permitting the President to issue a partial waiver

[7] Section 6(a)

[8] Section 10

[9]  Section 2 (4)

[10]  Section 2 (1)

[11]  Section 2 (6) and (8)