Statement of U.S. Integrated Carbon Steel Producers

This statement sets out the views of the four major integrated U.S. producers of carbon steel products – Bethlehem Steel Corporation; LTV Steel Company, Inc.; National Steel Corporation; and U.S. Steel Group, a Unit of USX Corporation – on a key issue connected to U.S. trade policy objectives and initiatives: official U.S. negotiating objectives relating to unfair trade practices and U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) remedies. We appreciate the opportunity to submit this statement for inclusion in the record of the hearing held by the Subcommittee on Trade on March 29, 2001.

The steel industry continues to support trade promotion authority to further open markets but believes that legislation enacting such authority must, consistent with prior enactments, make clear that the U.S. Government will not engage in negotiations that could weaken our unfair trade remedies.

Our industry has long supported a trade policy based upon open, fair, rule-based and market-based trade, coupled with effective trade laws to respond to unfair trade practices. The steel industry supported the Uruguay Round’s WTO agreements, which made major revisions to the international rules governing remedies against unfair trade practices. To be sure, our industry did not favor all aspects of the Uruguay Round changes – particularly those that weakened domestic trade remedies. (It is important to note that since its inception the GATT has condemned unfair trade practices and sanctioned antidumping and countervailing duty laws in response to such unfair trade.) Nevertheless, the steel industry backed the WTO agreements as a whole based on an understanding that these rules would not be weakened further in subsequent negotiations and that the United States, with the world’s largest open market, would have and enforce the strongest possible remedies consistent with the new rules.

Despite the fact that there already exists a built-in agenda for the next round of WTO negotiations and that the antidumping and countervailing duty rules are not part of that established agenda, some WTO members, many of whom have been found to be among the most egregious violators of the U.S. trade laws, have launched a concerted effort to renegotiate these rules. This is one more element of a multi-front attack on the U.S. trade laws. In the WTO, as well as in FTAA and APEC discussions, foreign governments continue to seek further erosion of U.S. trade remedies.

Our foreign competitors want their governments to reopen these agreements for a single purpose. They need the United States to absorb their dumped and subsidized excess steel production instead of taking the painful yet necessary steps to restructure and reduce their production overcapacity. The WTO-sanctioned trade remedy rules are the best means to compel foreign producers to rationalize production. As such, efforts to reopen WTO trade remedy agreements would not only deprive domestic producers of basic fair trade remedies in their own market, but would actually encourage foreign producers to maintain and supplement uneconomic production capacity. This is unacceptable.

The United States, therefore, needs strong negotiating goals to make clear to our trading partners that the Administration will not consider, and Congress will not implement, trade agreements that undermine U.S. unfair trade remedies.

In the past, official U.S. negotiating goals have always stressed the importance of strengthening subsidy discipline and improving anti-subsidy and antidumping remedies. For example, the 1988 fast-track provisions contained "principal trade negotiating objectives" specifically addressing the need to define, deter, and discourage the persistent use of unfair trade practices, including forms of subsidy and dumping.1 Other trade enactments, such as the NAFTA and CFTA Implementation Acts, have gone even further.

During the Ways and Means Committee’s 1997 consideration of fast track negotiating authority, the Committee adopted an amendment offered by Rep. Houghton (R-NY) that would have added the following "guidance for negotiators":

In the course of negotiations conducted under this title, the United States Trade Representative shall— . . . preserve the ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, and avoid agreements which lessen the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies . . . .

The fast track bill reported by the Senate Finance Committee in 1997 also contained language highlighting the importance of strong rules against dumping and subsidies.

Given the sustained attacks that we are witnessing on our basic unfair trade laws, it is essential that Congress establish ground rules for U.S. negotiators making it clear that WTO trade law rules will not be reopened for negotiation. Further, Congress should make clear that any statutory changes to AD/CVD laws will not be entitled to fast track procedures. To the extent changes to the trade laws are considered, Congress should have the opportunity to fully debate and amend any such proposals. Finally, it must be clear that Congress will not approve agreements weakening U.S. trade laws.

Strong and enforceable trade remedy laws are a key component of the international trading system and are an essential ingredient to maintain public support for greater trade liberalization. By ensuring that basic fair trade laws are not weakened in future negotiations, Congress will maximize the chances for a successful extension of trade promotion authority procedures and will enhance support for the world trading system.


1. Section 1101(b)(8) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(8)).